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Abstract
It is without question that our memory system evolved through a process of natural selection.
However, basic research into the evolutionary foundations of memory has commenced with
earnest only recently.  This is quite peculiar as the majority, perhaps even all, of memory research
relates to whether memory is adaptive or not.  In this Special Issue, we have assembled a variety
of papers that represent the cutting edge in research on the evolution of memory.  These papers
are centered on issues about the ultimate and proximate explanations of memory, the development
of the adaptive functions of memory, as well as the positive consequences that arise from the
current evolutionary form that our memory has taken.  In this article we briefly outline these
different areas and indicate why they are vital for a more complete theory of memory.  Further, we
argue that by adopting a more applied stance in the area of the evolution of memory, one of the
many future directions in this field could be a new branch of psychology that addresses question
in evolutionary legal psychology.
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What Kind of Memory has Evolution Wrought?
            That our memory system evolved through a process of natural selection is not in question.
Indeed, all of the articles in this Special Issue of Memory take this as a given, a kind of starting
point for each of their inquiries into the nature of the mechanisms that evolutionary pressures
selected to produce what is today our memory.  Rather, what the articles amassed in this Special
Issue of Memory all attempt to address is the question posed in the title of this article and each of
them does this in a very unique way.  Before we provide a synopsis of these contributions, we
outline the origins of this question and then provide a 21st century context for how memory
researchers have examined this problem.  Although the final word on what evolutionary pressures
begat memory has yet to be written, we hope that this special issue brings us somewhat closer to
understanding the proximate (and ultimate) mechanisms involved in a fitness-relevant memory
system.
            We begin with current speculation concerning the origins of today’s memory system, a
system that is said to have its beginnings some 500 million years ago during what is known as the
Cambrian explosion (see Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2007a, 2007b, 2010b; Paivio, 2007).  Before this,
a more rudimentary form of memory existed, one that controlled short- and long-term
sensitization and habituation (see Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2007a).  However, during the Cambrian
explosion, a memory system emerged, one that preserved newly learned associations (associative
memory) in stable, long-term memory traces.  A number of neurobiological evolutionary changes,
including cephalization, contributed to this advance, ones that afforded the composition of better
integrated and more durable memory traces (Eccles, 1989; Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2007b, 2010a).
The evolution of associative memory, a system that binds together otherwise disparate pieces of
information into unified and enduring traces, provided organisms that possessed it with at least
three survival-related advantages that the earlier form of memory did not provide:
            First, the binding of stimuli, which at the previous stage of evolution
            (before associative learning had evolved) merely accompanied
experiencing, becomes advantageous because it makes it possible to
distinguish between complex (combined) stimuli.  Second, learning-
dependent experiencing allows recognition and discrimination on the
basis of partial cues: for the hungry animal contingent associations
(e.g., vibrations) may be recognized and elicit an adaptive response,
food-seeking.  Third, since for the food-deprived but already experienced
[animal], food had become embodied, it gives the animal clues as to
what to do, since some of the activated traces are associated with successful
navigation towards the attractor-related stimuli (food, shelter and their
contexts).  The animal can now make an educated guess, based on past
experience. (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2010a, p. 114; emphases in original).
Thus, this newly evolved associative memory system provided animals with a memory
system that could be utilized to store its past experiences, interpret current cues to satisfy its needs
in the present, and to anticipate its future.  In addition, some have argued that the emergence of
associative memory, because it permits the mapping of past experiences onto future needs, may
have been in part responsible for the emergence of self-consciousness (see Edelman, 1989, 2003).
Although an in-depth discussion of this possibility is beyond the scope of this article, it does auger
well for many of the proposed links between our memory system and other cognitive processes,
including anticipating the future and problem solving, issues raised in the various articles in this
Special Issue.
Of course one of the problems with discussing the adaptive nature of memory today is that
we do not have any physical (e.g., fossil) records of associative memory from the past.  This ties
our hands in terms of being able to trace its evolutionary history or examine the evolutionary
pressures that led to its creation and change throughout time.  What this means is that speculation
concerning the adaptive nature of memory can lead us into a “just so” or “Panglossian” tautology.
As Gould and Lewontin (1979) suggested, despite the existence of adaptations, it is difficult to
know whether what you are studying is an adaptation unless you can trace its evolutionary
heritage.   That is, it is not clear which aspects of memory are the adaptations and which are “spin-
offs” of those elements that are adaptations.
Although such weighty issues will not be resolved in this article or in the articles
contained in this Special Issue, the articles presented in this issue will reveal fresh perspectives on
how such weighty issues could be resolved some day.  All of the papers show that our memory
system does facilitate fitness-relevant behaviors, ones that can enhance our survival and
reproductive fitness.  One way to partially avoid the pitfalls of just-so stories is to make a
distinction between ultimate and proximate explanations of a behavior (e.g., memory).  Ultimate
explanations answer the question of why a behavior evolved; in this case, why did memory evolve
and what are its fitness consequences?   Proximate explanations answer the question of how a
behavior evolved; in this case, how the processes of memory accomplish the evolutionary
function of memory?  By asking these more pointed questions, we can attempt to address the
more general questions about the adaptive nature of memory.
This is exactly what the articles contained in this special issue do.  We can roughly divide
these contributions into three types that are not independent and contain overlapping areas:  (1)
proximate and ultimate precursors of adaptive memory, (2) evolutionary developmental
psychology, and (3) salutary consequences of memory.  We will briefly deal with the
contributions contained each of these areas.
Proximate and Ultimate Precursors of Adaptive Memory
The view that our memory is functionally designed has been adopted by many researchers
(e.g., Anderson & Milson, 1989; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002). However, only
recently has the examination of the evolutionary “layers” of memory seen what appears to be an
almost exponential increase in activity.  This increase is probably due in large part to the novel
research program introduced by Nairne and his colleagues (e.g., Nairne, Thompson, &
Pandeirada, 2007).  Their intention was to assess these evolutionary layers in an a priori manner
by assuming that memory should be especially engineered to process information relevant for its
fitness value.
In their first scientific undertaking, they had participants imagine being stranded on the
grasslands of a foreign country, lacking any food and water and in potential danger from
predators.  Other participants were allocated to control conditions (e.g., imagining moving to
another country, pleasantness ratings).  Participants in all conditions were presented with a set of
unrelated words that had to be rated for the relevance of the imagined scenario.  When
subsequently given a surprise memory test, participants who processed information in a survival-
related situation evidenced enhanced memory performance above that seen in the other processing
conditions.  This effect, also known as the survival processing advantage, has been confirmed in a
plethora of subsequent studies (for reviews see Howe & Otgaar, 2013; Nairne & Pandeirada,
2008).
Although boundary conditions have been demonstrated as well in the survival-processing
paradigm (e.g., Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010; Savine, Skullin, & Roediger,
2010), a shift in this paradigm has recently been advocated, one that allows the detection of the
proximate mechanisms behind this survival-processing advantage.  This shift was needed because
studies began to show that the survival processing advantage was eliminated under certain
conditions (see Howe & Otgaar, 2013).  As outlined above, the discovery of proximate
mechanisms was imperative because they have the potential to show that survival processing per
se is perhaps not so special after all and that many of these effects may have been mediated by a
set of already well-known memory principles.  Thus, although addressing ultimate explanations
for the adaptive course of memory is vital, a new line of research has commenced, one that shows
that the survival processing advantage might be better specified by relying on already well-
documented proximate memory mechanisms.
In this Special Issue, we have followed this important line of research and hence, several
papers are included that concentrate on the proximate explanations of adaptive memory.
Although these explanations are not exhaustive, they do provide critical and novel perspectives on
how we should view the evolutionary constraints of memory.  The question that these papers do
attempt to address is whether our memory is primarily tuned for the encoding, storage, and
retrieval of survival-relevant material, narrowly defined, or whether part of the survival
processing advantage also might be triggered by susceptibility to threat (paper by Olds and
colleagues) or the anticipation of death (papers by Klein and by Burns and colleagues).  As well,
other papers in this section address questions concerning the longevity of the survival-processing
advantage over testing delays (paper by Raymaekers and colleagues) and whether there exist
working memory constraints on adaptive memory (paper by Kroneisen and colleagues).
Together, these papers provide fresh insights into the proximate mechanisms associated with
adaptive memory.
Evolutionary Developmental Psychology
As well as focusing on the underlying proximate mechanisms of adaptive memory, there is
increasing interest in an examination of the developmental trajectories of fitness-relevant memory
when explicating evolutionary-related behavior (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000).  Why this is an
important issue becomes obvious when taking a look at the amount of evolutionary research in
children and adults.  Indeed, the majority of evolutionary theorizing and research is concentrated
on reproductive success and social functioning in adults (e.g., Buss, 1995).  This is partly due to
the fact that the sine qua non of Darwinian theory is centered on the reproduction of adults.  This
absolute focus on evolutionary-related behavior in adults creates some disparities in the literature
as, of course, individuals must learn to survive through infancy and childhood in order to get to
the adult, reproductive stage.  Therefore, one might expect that natural selection exerts significant
pressure during childhood as it does throughout adulthood and that the consequences of this early
pressure should be apparent when researchers take the time to examine them in infancy and
childhood.  Thus, it is not surprising that researchers have advocated a closer examination of this
pressure early in life within the area of evolutionary developmental psychology (Bjorklund &
Pellegrini, 2000).
According to Bjorklund and Pellegrini (2000, p. 1687), “[e]volutionary developmental
psychology involves the expression of evolved, epigenetic programs in interaction with an
individual’s physical and social environment over the course of ontogeny.”  It is clear from this
definition that this new brand of evolutionary psychology embraces both the emergence of new
systems through development, also called epigenesis, together with the influence of the external
environment (Gottlieb, 1991).  With respect to the adaptive nature of memory, this implies that
one should be wary about solely focusing on adults, and that a complete picture will not emerge
until scientists include the developmental context in which adaptive memory emerges in the
individual.
In line with the evolutionary developmental psychological account, memory researchers
have recently examined whether mnemonic superiority for fitness-relevant processing appears in
childhood as well (Aslan & Bauml, 2012; Otgaar & Smeets, 2011).  To put it simply, younger (4-
to 8-year-olds) and older (9- to 11-year-olds) children also displayed a memory preference for
fitness-relevant processing.  The observation of these findings was crucial as one could suggest
that the survival processing advantage is only adaptive if it showcases in childhood too.  As we
will explain below, the timing of this advantage does not say anything about its functional role.
This idea is reflected in the concept of ontogenetic adaptations: neurobehavioral characteristics
that exert specific adaptive effects in developing species (Oppenheim, 1981).  Concretely, what
this means is that certain adaptations can have a specific function for survival during infancy, but
then vanish later in childhood.
Take, for example, the finding that the young of many species display certain special
survival behaviors (e.g., sucking reflex) that disappear when no longer needed.  Regarding the
developmental course of adaptive memory, we have recently argued that the timing and
emergence of the survival processing advantage in childhood does not indicate that our memory is
adaptive (Howe & Otgaar, 2013).  On the contrary, many adaptations emerge long after birth
(Confer et al., 2010), including bipedal locomotion (approximately one year after birth) or
language (during the second year of life).  We have argued that well-known memory principles
such as distinctiveness or elaboration effects are proximate mechanisms that are the cornerstone of
the survival processing advantage.  However, that they appear early in development and have
developmentally invariant characteristics is merely coincidental and is not necessarily diagnostic
of their adaptive value (Howe & Otgaar, 2013).
In this Special Issue, we follow the suggestion of Bjorklund and Pellegrini (2000) and
have included several papers dealing with the development of adaptive memory in both non-
human and human species (paper by Martin-Ordas and colleagues), children (papers by Atance
and colleagues as well as Otgaar and colleagues), and younger and older adults (paper by Gerlach
and colleagues).  As will be shown, adaptive memory effects are evident across species and are
evident in children as well as younger and older humans.  These are the findings that will
stimulate further research in the domain of evolutionary developmental psychology and will
provide fundamental knowledge about the developmental paths of adaptive memory.
Salutary Consequences of Memory
            It is without doubt that our memory has many positive consequences for adaptation.
Without our memory, we would not, for example, be able to remember our partner, to drive, or to
complete an exam.  However, because memory is a reconstructive (as opposed to reproductive)
system, some of our recollections can be illusory.  These false memories or memories for events
and details that were not experienced are especially hazardous when they appear in the legal arena
(e.g., Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & Raymaekers, in press; Loftus, 2005).  However, there
are also a number of salutary or positive consequences to memory illusions (Howe, 2011;
Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011).  The question that is important here is whether these
errors are by any chance advantageous or are they simply by-products of a flexible and
reconstructive memory system?
            One of the first indications that false memories are adaptive was delivered by research
showing that survival processing increased the formation of not just true memories but also the
creation of false memories (Howe & Derbish, 2010).  Furthermore, it was not just adults whose
true and false memories increased, but so too did children’s memories (Otgaar & Smeets, 2010).
These findings eventually stimulated research into the positive consequences of false memories.
For example, Howe and his colleagues (Howe, Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011; Howe,
Garner, Dewhurst, & Ball, 2010) showed that false memories serve as effective primes when
children and adults attempt to solve insight-based problems. That is, participants who were
presented with lists of associatively-related words and remembered associatively-related but not-
presented words were better at solving insight-based problems than child and adult participants
who did not develop a false memory.  These effects have recently been extended to more complex
problem-solving tasks such as proportional analogical reasoning (Howe, Threadgold, Norbury,
Garner, & Ball, in press).  This Special Issue encompasses contributions that speak to this more
positive side of memory errors (papers by Garner and Howe and by Gerlach and colleagues).
            In addition to examining the positive side of false memories, there is research on how
adaptive memory, more generally, has positive consequences that may not have been considered
outside of this evolutionary context.  For example, as mentioned, memory is used not just to
remember the past, but also to interpret the present and anticipate the future.  Indeed, this latter
area, episodic future thought, has been an emerging area of interest for the past few years and this
line of research is well represented in this Special Issue as well (paper by Atance and colleagues).
Curiously, simulations of future events can also have negative consequences on memories for the
past, distortions that Gerlach and colleagues term adaptive constructive processes.
            The intent of these papers is to show that many facets of memory have beneficial and
positive reconstructive consequences – that is, our survival and reproductive success may not
necessarily be related to the accuracy of memory, but rather, on how well our memories (true or
false) help us navigate the world we live in.  Of course, it is not just the memories that are critical,
but it is also how we view what we remember that is important.  Indeed, humans rely to some
extent on how confident they are in their memories, with higher confidence leading to perhaps
more reliance on these memories.  Of course, the link between confidence and reliance on
memories may be a trickier one than first thought, and the adaptive consequences of this
relationship is explored in the paper by Roediger and DeSoto.  Together, all of these papers shed
more light on the adaptive nature of our memory by exploiting the larger sphere of influence in
which memory operates, including its effects on cognitive and metacognitive processes.
Concluding Remarks
A logical next step is to speculate on how the study of the evolution of memory could
change.  This is not easy because each new development herein should be critically evaluated
because “just-so” explanations are constantly lurking in this area.  One plausible direction would
be to see which area of investigation would potentially benefit from findings regarding the
evolutionary course of memory.  This should be an area that could profit from both an ultimate
and proximate explanation of memory.
Here, we suggest that one area for further exploration is in a more applied domain,
specifically, in memory and the law.  Much (or sometimes all) of the evidence brought into court
relies on eyewitness evidence and thus focuses on memory performance.  In court, it is not
uncommon for legal professionals to ask questions pertaining to the ultimate (e.g., “Why do we
have memory illusions?”; “Why do psychopaths lie?”) or proximate (e.g., “How do such memory
illusions develop?”; “How do people lie?”) explanations of memory performance.  What we
should keep in mind in this exercise is that asking ultimate and proximate questions in court
indirectly points to an assumption of existence.  To give a clear example, if a judge asks why (i.e.,
an ultimate question) people become amnesic when they experience a traumatic event (Peters, van
Oorsouw, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, in press), one assumes that amnesia for a traumatic experience
is a common phenomenon.  So, asking a why-question indirectly assumes that a certain
phenomenon exists.
Evolutionary legal psychology could aid in such circumstances and could provide a more
complete overview of why (e.g., research on the survival processing advantage) and how (e.g.,
research on which mechanisms influence memory performance) certain psychological phenomena
occur and how these explanations are best situated within a courtroom context.  That is, this new
branch of psychology would refer to the manifestation of evolved psychological phenomena that
could be relevant in legal situations.   Of course, this branch would not be restricted to only
evolutionary research on memory, it would include all those areas of psychological research that
often manifest themselves in the legal field (e.g., lying, malingering, dissociation, amnesia, false
memory, facial processing, eyewitness identification).
What is important to take into account in this discussion is that many memory experts are
called upon as expert witnesses in court.  Situations in which memory serves as the only evidence,
for example in cases involving claims about historic child sexual abuse, answers to questions
about the why and how of memory functioning necessarily take center stage (Howe, in press).
These cases are often about an alleged victim who, when very young (e.g., 2 to 5 years of age),
was allegedly abused and now, many years later (frequently some 20 or more years later), can
ostensibly remember quite vividly being abused these many years ago.  In such cases, it is not
unusual that a diverse set of so-called “well-established” memory phenomena is at the foreground.
 Ideas like repression and dissociation are frequently used by legal professionals to argue that
memories can be hidden from consciousness for considerable periods of time and that such
traumatic events, especially those from early in life (i.e., before the sixth year) can be vividly
recollected many years later.  We argue that to offer these legal professionals with a better grasp
of the intricacies of these phenomena, one could adopt an evolutionary legal psychological
approach.  That is, besides focusing on which (proximate) mechanisms are involved in these
phenomena, it would significantly add to provide an ultimate account of these phenomena.
Take for example the idea of repression.  Although repression is well appreciated by many
clinicians, scientific evidence does not instill strong confidence in the idea that repression actually
exists (McNally, 2005).  Indeed, the concept of repression does not really seem plausible from an
evolutionary point of view.  That is, why (i.e., ultimate question) should we have a memory
system that evolved to repress memories that are experienced as traumatic?  One could argue that
a more fitness-relevant memory system would be one that better remembered such negative events
so that the person could make more effective future plans to avoid or deal more effectively with
similar events.  This view is corroborated by research showing that negative events are indeed
better recollected than more mundane events (McNally, 2005).
An evolutionary psychological argument could help immensely in such cases, one that
included both why- and how-explanations.  Such an approach has two advantages.  On the one
hand, legal professionals (e.g., judges, jurors) would be more informed about the precise details of
certain phenomena and hence, could make better decisions.  On the other hand, expert witnesses
are forced by this evolutionary legal psychological account to focus not only on the proximate
mechanisms of certain phenomena, but to examine whether an ultimate explanation can also be
addressed.  Indeed, legal scholars are already increasingly embracing knowledge from
evolutionary psychology to understand behavior in a legal context (see Confer et al., 2010).  One
specific example is the formation of the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL: see
www.sealsite.org) in which interdisciplinary issues between law, biology, and evolutionary
psychology are combined into a more coherent view about law and behavior.  Such work could,
for example, lead to better insight in decision-making processes among legal professionals (Jones
& Goldsmith, 2005).  It is important to contrast this new area of psychology with evolutionary
forensic psychology (Duntley & Shackelford, 2008) that stresses the more clinical and
evolutionary aspects of psychology (e.g., question related to the why and how of rape, violence).
Evolutionary legal psychology has the potential to stimulate research in novel directions and
certain new research avenues could already be placed under this flag (e.g., Howe, 2011).
It is clear that the papers included in this Special Issue have the potential to push the field
of adaptive memory a step further.  We think it is imperative that scholars become acquainted
with research on the evolution of memory, as it will likely apply to their domain of research as
well.  If true, then we would expect to see many future papers handling these more fundamental
and evolutionary aspects of memory, ones that will eventually lead to a better understanding of
the proximate and ultimate questions about why and how our memory evolved.  Importantly, such
an understanding does not necessarily need to remain within the confines of psychological
science, but as we have argued in this section, may have some very important pragmatic
consequences as well.
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